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Abstract 
Auditors’ reliance on decision aids has been the subject of much research in the 
decision-aid literature. Extant literature shows that auditors are somewhat reluctant to 
rely on decision aids throughout the audit process, despite potential improvement in 
decision accuracy. The objective of this study is to empirically examine the extent to 
which auditors’ reliance on decision aids is associated with the perceived levels of time 
pressure, task complexity and litigation risk—decision aid reliance factors that have been 
understudied in the auditing literature.  In a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental 
design, the independent variables were manipulated as follows: time pressure (high, low), 
task complexity (high, low) and litigation risk (high, low). The dependent variable 
reflects the level of reliance on a decision aid. Study results indicate a positive 
relationship between each of the three factors and decision aid reliance. A three-way 
interaction was also indicated, suggesting that the joint effect of litigation risk and task 
complexity depends on the level of perceived time pressure.  Study findings hold 
implications for both practicing auditors and audit researchers, particularly in the 
increasingly litigious environment in which auditors are immersed. 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally argued that proper use of decision aids can improve decision 
accuracy, thus audit effectiveness (Benbasat and Nault, 1990; Ashton 1992; Vlemmix et 
al., 2012). Extant literature, however, shows that auditors are somewhat reluctant to rely 
on decision aids (Pincus, 1989; Ross, 2002; Boritz, and Timoshenko, 2014). Audit 
research in the area of decision aid reliance has mainly been limited to the effect of 
incentives, feedback, expertise, knowledge and justification (e.g., Ashton, 1990; 
Boatsman et al., 1997; and Rose, 2002). The current study furthers this line of research 
by examining the main and interactive effects of three additional factors that have 
received much attention in audit research, but little consideration in the auditing decision 
aid literature – litigation risk, time pressure and task complexity (e.g., Palmrose, 1988; 
Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Arnold et al., 1997; Bonner, 1994).  
A major source of time pressure in an audit environment arises from budget 
constraints. Several studies have indicated that audit performance can deteriorate when 
auditors work under excessive time pressure (e.g., Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Arnold 
et al., 1997). When time is a constraint, decision aids can enhance the efficiency, and 
some would argue the effectiveness, of auditors’ decision-making processes, especially in 
highly structured environments.  
 Task complexity is another important factor in the decision aid reliance equation. 
Many audit tasks are highly complex and the intricacy of such tasks can have a major 
impact on audit judgments (Bonner, 1994; Libby, 1985). The use of decision aids in the 
decision making process can help improve judgment quality, thus audit effectiveness, 
when task complexity increases.  
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The third decision aid reliance factor examined in this study deals with audit 
litigation risk. The seriousness of the problem is evident by the increasing number of 
lawsuits filed against audit firms (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984; Palmrose, 1988; Stice, 
1991; Gomaa et al., 2008; and Arel, 2010), which serves to heighten auditors’ awareness 
that they need to pay a great deal of attention to audit quality.  When faced with a high 
risk of litigation, the use of a decision aid can improve audit effectiveness and help 
auditors justify their judgment decisions should a lawsuit be filed (Lowe and Reckers, 
2002). 
Despite potential improvement in decision accuracy provided by the use of decision 
aids, current practices show that auditors rely more on their judgment than on decision 
aids throughout the auditing process (Pincus, 1989; Ross, 2002; Boritz and Timoshenko, 
2014).  Existing research provides little explanation for such behavior. The current study 
proposes that under-reliance might be explained by a lack of sufficient exogenous 
pressure, and argues that client litigation risk has become so dominate and costly in the 
U.S. that auditors are now more consciously aware than ever of the benefits of decision 
aids. 
The between-subjects experiment reported herein manipulated time pressure (high, 
low), task complexity (high, low) and litigation risk (high, low). The dependent variable 
reflects the level of reliance on a decision aid.  Study results suggest a positive 
relationship between each of the three factors and decision aid reliance. A significant 
three-way interaction suggests that the effect of litigation risk and task complexity on 
decision aid reliance depends on the perceived level of time pressure 
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Research of this nature is especially important in light of the increased litigation 
risk and related cost faced by the audit profession.  Findings from this study provide 
further understanding of auditor judgment and decision-making with respect to reliance 
on decision aids, and open the door for future research in this area. 
 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Time Pressure 
Two lines of research can be identified in the existing time pressure literature 
(Arnold et al., 2000). The first examines behavioral responses to time pressure (e.g., 
Mann and Tan, 1993; Alderman and Dietrick, 1982; and Arnold et al., 1997), while the 
other investigates the effects of time pressure on cognitive decision making processes 
(e.g., Smith et al., 1997; and Arnold et al., 2000).  Both lines of research suggest that 
when individuals make judgmental decisions under time pressure, they are subject to 
“hypervigilance” (Mann and Tan, 1993).  The concept of hypervigilance refers to a 
mental state in which a decision maker, when placed under a relatively high level of 
perceived time pressure, “is reduced to panicky, incomplete information search before 
selecting an (often) inferior course of action” (p. 189). Also, as noted by Mann and Tan 
(1993, 198), this often results in “high stress, a marked deterioration in thinking and 
judgment, a narrowing perception of options, an incomplete and haphazard search of 
information, vacillation, and, finally, an impulsive choice.” 
Behavioral studies examining the effect of time pressure in auditing environments 
indicate that audit performance deteriorates due to time pressure through narrowed 
scopes, reduced work on certain audit procedures, reliance on lower quality evidence, 
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premature audit sign-offs, and omission of some audit procedures (e.g. Alderman and 
Deitrick, 1982; Arnold et al., 1997, 2000).  The second line of time pressure research, 
focusing on the effects of time pressure on decision-making processes (e.g., Arnold et al., 
2000; Smith et al., 1997), supports the behavioral findings and concludes that time 
pressure has a positive effect on audit efficiency, which often triggers an unintended 
negative effect on audit effectiveness. 
In a typical audit engagement, auditors should be concerned with both aspects of 
audit performance - effectiveness and efficiency. Given the high time-pressure audit 
environment in which audits are typically conducted, limitations on human information 
processing coupled with advances in information technology ought to lead rational 
auditors to use whatever means available to help improve audit efficiency and 
effectiveness.  However, as indicated by prior audit research, auditors’ primary 
motivation for relying on decision aids will likely be driven by their desire to be more 
efficient, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: There will be a positive relationship between perceived time pressure and 
auditors’ decision aid reliance. 
 
 
2.2 Audit Task Complexity 
Many of the tasks auditors perform are highly complex and such complexity can 
have a major impact on audit judgments (Bonner, 1994; Libby, 1985). Several studies in 
psychology and management have shown that task complexity can have a wide range of 
effects on judgment and, in general, an increase in task complexity tends to decrease 
judgment quality (Bonner, 1994).  
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Several definitions of task complexity have been proposed in the literature, each 
considering different aspects in their definitions. For example, studies in different 
domains have looked at whether task complexity is a function of the task itself, or 
whether it depends on both the task and the person performing the task (Bonner, 1994; 
Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986). Studies that believe task complexity is a function of the 
task alone generally assert that the task complexity is perceived equally by all individuals 
irrespective of their personal attributes, such as skill or motivation (Bonner, 1994; 
Campbell, 1998).  
Other studies believe that the attributes of the person performing the task can 
interact with objective task complexity (Bonner, 1994; Campbell, 1998). These studies 
examined personal characteristics, such as skill and insight, as well as task 
characteristics, such as the task’s mode of representation or the number of processes 
required to perform the task (e.g. Frost and Mahonev, 1976). Although the predicted 
effects of task complexity on judgment performance would not differ between these two 
views, the current study views task complexity as a perception, not an objective state.  
This definitional view of task complexity assumes that such complexity is an interactive 
function of objective aspects of the task and personal characteristics of the decision-
maker. 
The use of decision aids in the decision making process can help improve judgment 
quality in the presence of complex tasks. Prior research documents a positive relationship 
between task complexity and decision aid use (Arnold and Sutton, 1998). Decision aid 
literature also suggests that different types of decision aids are required for tasks of 
differing complexity (Abdolmohammadi, 1997).  
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The effect of task complexity on decision making and decision aid reliance has 
been examined by several researchers in differing domains (e.g. Brown and Jones, 1998; 
Baron et al., 1996; Masha and Miller, 2001; Hornic and Ruf, 1997). Most research in this 
area documents a positive relationship between task complexity and decision aid reliance 
(Arnold and Sutton, 1998).  Findings from this line of inquiry also indicate that decision 
aids are more beneficial for high complexity tasks, as they improve decision accuracy. 
Finally, information systems and psychology research results suggest that, in an 
environment of high task complexity, a decision maker tends to rely on the decision aid 
to improve judgment quality. Extending these findings into an auditing context, since the 
accuracy of the decision is important, an auditor will tend to search for a smarter way of 
performing the task if it is highly complex, thus resulting in higher reliance on the 
decision aid’s advice with the objective of becoming more effective. This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H2: There will be a positive relationship between perceived task complexity and 
auditors’ decision aid reliance. 
 
 
2.3 Litigation Risk 
Negligence lawsuits are a serious problem facing the auditing profession. 
Accounting firms are increasingly becoming targets of litigation, reflecting a change in 
public opinion toward the role of auditors (Jennings et al., 1993; Stice, 1991). Litigation 
is costly to auditors in several ways. Audit firms not only face potentially huge monetary 
payments due to litigation, but they must also contend with damaged reputations, which 
can lead investors to attribute lower quality to the services they provide. As a result of 
litigation effects, audit firms can be forced to downsize or declare bankruptcy (Palmrose, 
 7 
1988). Because of the potentially severe deleterious effects of litigation, auditors 
regularly assess litigation risk in their audit planning process, which helps them align 
their audit investment with the possibility of audit failure (Stice, 1991).  
The level of litigation risk is not constant across all audit engagements, as it varies 
with client attributes1, audit firm characteristics2, and global litigious environments3. 
When forming judgments, auditors know that they will be held accountable for the 
decisions they make (Stice, 1991; Messier et al., 1992). As stated by Ashton et al. (1989, 
130), in auditing “because of the environment, the professional auditor must be prepared 
to justify, document, and take responsibility for his/her judgments and decisions” 
(Messier et al., 1992). This adds additional pressure on auditors to improve performance 
and take into consideration the possibility of having to justify their decisions to a 
supervisor or in court of arbitration or law. In a high litigation engagement, auditors will 
not only perform additional testing, but will also try to make the most defensible 
decisions in the eyes of a jury. This decision making process has been referred to by Staw 
(1980) as “prospective rationality” where individuals know in advance that they may 
have to defend their decisions to others. In these situations, auditors will try to identify 
the most defensible position and will devote substantial cognitive effort to do so (Messier 
et al. 1992).  
In order to improve the quality of the audit and provide consistence of such quality, 
several audit firms have adopted more structured methods of operation (Jennings et al., 
                                                 
1 The effectiveness of a firm’s internal control or the financial condition of a firm can affect the likelihood 
of material misstatements occurring in financial statements leading to a higher risk of litigation. 
2 The amount of resources available to the auditor or the tenure of the audit/client relationship are factors 
that can lead to audit failures. 
3 Legal environments differ among countries. 
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1993). One approach to enhance an auditor’s decision-making and/or performance in 
such highly structured environments is to use cost-effective decision aids. Prior decision 
aid research indicates that the use of these decision aids generally increases the decision 
accuracy and performance of decision makers (e.g. Benbasat and Nault, 1990; Ashton, 
1992), and reduces the likelihood of auditors making inconsistent decisions in similar 
situations (Jennings et al., 1993). Decision aids may also be used to reduce negative 
outcomes of litigation (Lowe and Reckers, 2000). 
 Decision aids provide auditors with a means by which they can reach the same 
conclusion when met with similar situations at different times (consistency), and reach 
different conclusions in different situations (distinctiveness). In a legal environment, 
jurists tend to consider audit decision aids as a form of internal guidance and a surrogate 
standard of performance provided by accounting firms and they not only look at the size 
of the error, but also look at the materiality of the auditor’s departure from the decision 
aid in their determination of auditor liability (Jennings et al., 1993). If there is a material 
misstatement and a large departure from the decision aid, a jury will assess higher 
liability to the auditor. That is, a judge or jury might feel that the auditor violated a 
standard leading to an increased perception of culpability and liability (Jennings et al., 
1993). On the other hand, if there is little deviation from the audit decision aid (internal 
guidance), a judge or jury may consider adherence to the decision aid (structured 
guidance) as a positive signal of the auditor’s due diligence and responsibility (Jennings 
et al., 1993). This suggests that, when faced with high perceived litigation risk, auditors 
are expected to rely more on a decision aid to be in a better position to defend themselves 
if faced with litigation. 
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Several researchers have studied the effect of decision consequences (a proxy for 
litigation risk) on a user’s level of reliance on a decision aid (e.g. Ashton, 1990; and 
Boatsman et al., 1997). Their results show that the manipulation of decision 
consequences can affect the level of reliance on a decision aid. Auditors tend to rely on 
decision aids when there is a higher cost of audit failure (Boatsman et al., 1997). In 
addition, when a decision aid with a high implicit performance standard is provided, 
decision makers tend to use it to assist in their decision making processes (Ashton, 1990).  
Combining the results of decision aid literature with those of the litigation risk 
suggests that auditors in a high litigation risk environment will tend to rely more on 
decision aids than auditors in a low litigation risk environment, as auditors in a high 
litigation environment are trying to improve and ensure audit effectiveness. This leads to 
the third hypothesis: 
H3: There will be a positive relationship between perceived litigation risk and 
auditors’ decision aid reliance. 
 
2.4 Joint Effects of Time Pressure, Task Complexity and Litigation Risk 
Rational auditors will continuously try to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of their performance in an audit engagement. Each of the three factors examined herein 
(time pressure, task complexity, and litigation risk) creates ‘pressure’ on an auditor to 
either improve audit efficiency or audit effectiveness. Assuming that the pressures 
created by these factors are linear and equally weighted, one can think about such 
pressures in the form of ‘DA reliance motivator units’.  While the assumptions of 
linearity and equal weighting may not be precisely correct, since there is no empirical 
evidence to the contrary, these assumptions reflect a “first approximation” of how various 
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combinations of these pressures jointly motivate auditors to perform better through the 
decision aid reliance. 
As discussed in previous sections, when auditors experience a high level of time 
pressure, they are concerned with completing the audit within the amount of time 
allowed; in such instances, they will be motivated to improve their performance to gain 
audit efficiency, thereby resulting in one DA reliance motivator unit.  When auditors are 
faced with performing a complex task, they will be concerned with the effectiveness of 
their performance, thereby giving rise to a second motivational unit of DA reliance. 
Auditors who are faced with high litigation risk will be concerned with the accuracy of 
their judgment; hence, they also will be motivated to improve their performance to gain 
audit effectiveness, thus reflecting a third motivational unit of DA reliance. The joint and 
interactive effect of these three variables on auditors’ decision aid reliance is examined in 
the following sections. 
2.4.1 Time Pressure and Task Complexity 
Time pressure and task complexity are expected to jointly affect decision aid 
reliance, as the former motivates the auditor to rely on a decision aid to be more efficient 
and the latter to be more effective.  Byström and Järvelin (1995) show that as the 
complexity of a task increases, individuals tend to look for other sources to help perform 
the task. When auditors are faced with performing a complex task under time pressure, 
the increased pressure resulting from the perceived time pressure and the cognitive 
overload caused by the perceived task complexity is expected to lead them to search for 
help, such as a decision aid. This suggests that, in an auditing context where auditors are 
frequently faced with complex decision-making situations under time pressure, they will 
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tend to rely on decision aids in their decision making process to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their performance. However, assuming that each of the DA reliance 
motivator units to improve efficiency or effectiveness provides a fairly equal (i.e., 
additive) incentive to rely on a decision aid, no interaction is expected between the two 
variables.  
2.4.2 Time Pressure and Litigation Risk 
 When operating under relatively high time pressure, auditors will be mainly 
concerned with completing their tasks within the time budget allowed.  In such a case, 
they will be motivated to rely on decision aids to gain audit efficiency.  Auditors faced 
with high litigation risk will be concerned with the accuracy of their judgment, thus 
motivated to use decision aids to improve audit effectiveness.  As with the prior section, 
assuming that each of the DA reliance motivator units to improve efficiency or 
effectiveness provides a fairly equal (i.e. additive) incentive to rely on a decision aid, no 
interaction is expected between these two variables.  
2.4.3 Task Complexity and Litigation Risk 
An auditor’s level of reliance on a decision aid can also be affected by the 
combined influences of the complexity of the task at hand and the consequences of 
making a wrong decision (litigation risk). The pressure to rely on a decision aid created 
by either task complexity or litigation risk arises from the same motivational source—to 
be more effective.  The empirical and theoretical question here is: Do two effectiveness 
DA reliance motivators exhibit an additive or interactive effect?  
There are two ways to consider the impact of two effectiveness motivators.  On one 
hand, as with the prior two sections, one can assume that each of the DA reliance 
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motivator units to improve effectiveness provides a fairly equal (i.e. additive) incentive to 
rely on a decision aid, thus, no interaction would be expected between the two variables, 
as the effect is additive. On the other hand, providing two incentives to improve audit 
effectiveness might not result in an additive increase in the level of decision aid reliance; 
thus, the possibility of a competing hypothesis arises.  
For example, if auditors are faced with performing an audit in a high litigation risk 
or high task complexity environment, either source of pressure will motivate them to 
improve the accuracy of their decisions (i.e. they will have one DA reliance motivator 
unit to improve audit effectiveness). When auditors are simultaneously faced with a 
second motivator to be more effective (e.g. either high task complexity or high litigation 
risk), they will again be motivated to increase audit effectiveness (i.e. they will have 
another DA reliance motivator unit to improve audit effectiveness).  In either case, adding 
a second motivator to improve audit effectiveness might not necessarily lead to a higher 
level of decision aid reliance, as the auditor will already be putting forth extra effort to 
improve audit effectiveness, including relying on the decision aid. This leads to a 
possible interaction hypothesis:  
H4: Decision aid reliance will be lowest when perceived task complexity and 
perceived litigation risk are low and highest when perceived task complexity 
and/or perceived litigation risk are/is high. 
 
 
2.4.4 Time Pressure, Task Complexity and Litigation Risk 
If each DA reliance motivator is additive, there should be no three-way interaction. 
However, as expressed in H4 above, there is reason to expect a two-way interaction 
between task complexity and litigation risk, thus giving rise to a possible three-way 
interaction. 
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Considering H4 and holding time pressure low (no incentive to be more efficient), 
one would expect the same result as predicted in H4, as next hypothesized: 
H5a: Holding time pressure low, decision aid reliance will be lowest when 
perceived task complexity and perceived litigation risk are low and highest 
when perceived task complexity and/or perceived litigation risk are/is high. 
 
Next, assume H4 and hold time pressure high (one DA reliance unit based on 
efficiency).  One would expect the same pattern of results as predicted in H4 and H5a, 
only the levels should be higher due to the constant inducement of time pressure to be 
more efficient. This leads to the final hypothesis: 
H5b: Holding time pressure high, the same decision aid reliance pattern predicted 
in H5a will obtain; however, the pattern will be significantly higher due to 
the constant DA reliance motivator of time pressure. 
 
 
3. Research Method 
In order to examine the effect of time pressure, task complexity and litigation risk 
on auditor's reliance on a decision aid, an experiment was conducted in a controlled 
environment using software specially designed for the experiment. Computerized 
automation of the experiment enabled more control over participants and experimental 
manipulations during task performance.  The software provided all experimental 
information to the participants and allowed for recording of responses during the 
experiment.  
The experiment involved a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects design. The three 
independent variables were time pressure, task complexity and litigation risk. Each factor 
was manipulated between-subjects at two levels (high or low), resulting in eight 
treatment conditions.  
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3.1 Pilot Testing 
Three pilot tests were conducted to develop and refine the test instruments. The 
first pilot test was conducted during a research seminar offered in a large research 
university in the Netherlands. Eighteen Ph.D. students from various European 
universities participated in the pilot test. The aim of the first pilot test was to examine the 
task complexity manipulation in order to make any necessary changes to the instrument. 
Based on the first pilot test, several changes were made to the test instrument, mainly to 
lower the complexity of the ‘high task complexity’ materials, as the complexity was 
perceived to be too high. 
A second pilot test was conducted to determine the mean amount of time it took 
participants to complete the high and low complex tasks, and examine the effectiveness 
of the task complexity and litigation risk manipulations. Twenty-one audit seniors and 
managers from a Big-4 public accounting firm in the United States participated in the 
pilot test.  The results of the second pilot test indicated an effective manipulation of the 
perceived task complexity and perceived litigation risk variables, and made possible the 
determination of “perceived time pressure” for the next pilot test.  
The first two pilot tests used paper-based materials. In order to provide more 
experimental control during the administration of the experiment, a computerized version 
of the test instrument was developed. The third pilot test also determined the 
effectiveness of the perceived time pressure manipulation in the high and low task 
complexity conditions, and tested the computerized version of the main experiment. 
Twenty-two audit seniors and managers from a Big-4 public accounting firm in the 
United States participated in this pilot test. In the high time pressure condition, the 
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participants were given a time limit calculated by subtracting two standard deviations 
from the mean completion time to perform the task, as determined in the second pilot 
test; participants in the low time pressure condition were given a time limit calculated by 
adding two standard deviations to the mean completion time to perform the task.  Results 
of time pressure manipulation check questions revealed that the participants did perceive 
high time pressure and low time pressure in the appropriate task complexity conditions. 
Also, the software worked as planned on the firm’s network. 
3.2 Task 
Participants were provided with a set of information containing instructions and 
case materials. The instructions emphasized the importance of their participation, and 
made clear that their responses would be strictly confidential and be used solely for the 
purpose of this study. Participants were also provided with information about the time 
allowed to perform the task. This was done to facilitate the manipulation of high (low) 
time constraint, as well as perceived time pressure.  
The case material described a large manufacturing corporation in which accounts 
receivables represent a significant percentage of current assets. Participants were 
provided with management’s estimate of the allowance for uncollectible accounts and the 
aging of accounts receivable schedules for the previous five years. They were also told 
that management and the audit committee of the board of directors believe that 
management’s estimate fairly represents the amount of uncollectible accounts at the end 
of the year and that both management and the audit committee are reluctant to change the 
allowance amount.  After reviewing the case materials, participants were asked to provide 
their estimate of the dollar amount of uncollectible accounts at the end of the year and to 
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declare the amount of year-end adjusting journal entry they would require of 
management, if any.  Embedded within the case materials, were manipulations of time 
pressure, task complexity and litigation risk, as more fully explained in upcoming 
sections.  
All participants were then provided with the advice of a decision aid. The decision 
aid was designed to assist in evaluating the reasonableness of the allowance for doubtful 
accounts. Participants were told that using the decision aid output was intended to be 
advisory only. After reviewing the decision aid’s advice, and given an option to re-
examine the client’s financial information, participants provided a second assessment of 
the dollar amount of uncollectible accounts and year-end adjusting journal entry 
recommendation. They were fully aware that they did not have to change their initial 
responses, or they could change the initial amounts in any direction or magnitude they 
deemed appropriate.  
 
3.3 Procedure 
The experimental software was installed on the intranet and extranet servers of each 
of the participating public accounting firms.  The experiment was simultaneously run in 
all participating firms for a period of one week. At the beginning of the experiment, each 
participant was randomly assigned one of the eight between-subject treatments.  All 
participants in each condition were presented with a set of instructions on their screens, 
followed by the case materials. The experiment software controlled the amount of time 
allowed to complete the task and recorded the participants’ responses into an Access 
database. Upon the completion of the task, participants were asked to fill out a post-
experiment questionnaire.  
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3.4 Experimental incentives 
Participation in the experiment was voluntary. A fixed financial incentive system 
was used to encourage participation. Participants were informed that $50 would be 
donated to the charity of their choice for their participation.  
3.5 Experimental variables 
The following subsections explain the independent variables, decision aid 
treatment, and dependent variable in more detail. 
3.5.1 Independent Variables 
Time Pressure 
Researchers studying time pressure typically measure such pressure by allocating 
specific time to perform a task (e.g. Ahituv et al., 1998). However, a distinction needs to 
be made between absolute time and time pressure (Fisher et al., 2003). Fisher et al. 
(2003, 174) define a time constraint as “a specific allotment of time for making a 
decision, while time pressure is a subjective reaction to the amount of time allotted.” 
Additionally, Svenson and Edland (1987) explain that individuals experience time 
pressure whenever they perceive the time available to complete a task as being shorter 
than what would normally be required to complete the task. Time pressure may be felt by 
some individuals in an objectively high time pressure condition, while others might not 
feel time pressure under the same condition (Fisher et al., 2003). Since the participants’ 
reliance on the decision aid’s advice will be affected not only by the amount of time 
given to perform the task but also by their perception of time pressure, participant’s 
perceived time pressure was used to determine the extent to which the time pressure 
manipulation was successful. 
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Task Complexity 
Task complexity was varied by manipulating the clarity of input, which has been 
defined and used by many researchers as a manipulation of task complexity (e.g. 
Moriarity, 1979; Payne et al., 1990a, 1990b, 1992; Bonner, 1994). In the current study, 
task complexity was manipulated at two levels, high and low. In the high task complexity 
condition, participants were presented with the financial ratios and accounts receivable 
aging schedules in narrative form. For the low task complexity conditions, participants 
were provided with exactly the same information; however, the financial ratios and 
accounts receivable aging schedules were presented in tabular form.  
Litigation Risk 
Litigation risk is manipulated at two levels, high and low. In the high litigation risk 
condition participants were given information about the outcomes of failing to reach the 
appropriate judgment regarding the allowance for doubtful accounts and the possible 
legal consequences. In the low litigation risk condition, participants were given similar 
information; however, the probability of being sued and the consequences of being sued 
will be only a fraction of the high litigation case.  
3.5.2 Decision Aid 
To measure the effects of a decision aid on participants’ judgment decisions, the 
output of a decision aid was provided after participants provided their initial judgment. 
They were then asked to provide their final judgment. The participants were told that the 
decision aid is provided to assist them during their audit. In addition, they were told that 
the output of the decision is intended to be advisory only and that the ultimate decision 
regarding the estimate of the allowance for uncollectible accounts is their judgment call. 
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Information on what the decision aid analyzed was provided before providing its estimate 
of the allowance for uncollectible accounts. Participants were told that the decision aid 
was correct 8 out of 10 times in the past, yielding an 80% reliability score. The reliability 
of 80% was chosen as prior decision aid reliance research showed that providing 
participants with a decision aid with very low reliability leads to non-reliance, as 
participants feel that they will always perform better than the decision aid. Prior research 
also indicated that providing participants with a decision aid that is highly reliable (e.g. 
95% to 100%) leads to over-reliance, as participants feel that using the decision aid will 
yield correct results every time. Therefore, to measure the effects of the decision aid on 
judgment decisions, a reliability of 80% is commonly used in decision aid reliance 
research. 
3.5.3 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study reflects the level of reliance on the decision 
aid, as used by Hayes (2002), wherein he examined a measure of reliance based on the 
amount the participants changed their prediction to agree with the decision aid's advice. 
This measure shows how much the decision aid's advice influenced the participant's final 
response. It is calculated as follows (range from 0.00 to 1.00): 
Decision Aid Reliance = 
)Adjustment Recomended initial st'Participan - advice said'Decision (
)Adj Recomended initial st'Participan - Adj Recomended final st'Participan(  
By comparing the difference between the participant’s initial and final 
recommendations to the difference between the decision aid’s advice and the 
participant’s initial recommendation, the reliance function is able to show how much the 
decision aid’s advice influenced the participant’s final recommendation. The participant’s 
 20 
recommended adjustment, as opposed the participant’s estimate of uncollectible 
accounts, was used in the reliance function as it took into account not only how the 
decision aid affected their estimate of the allowance for uncollectible accounts but also 
the effect it had on their recommended adjustment for uncollectible accounts. 
4.  Results  
4.1 Participants 
A total of 235 auditors, including 203 seniors and 32 managers from two of the Big 
4 public accounting firms participated in the study. Participants worked in various offices 
of these two firms located in five large cities in the United States. The mean (median) age 
range of the participants was 31 to 40 (31 to 35) years, with an average of 5.11 years of 
experience. The participants included 89 male participants and 146 female participants.4  
Descriptive statistics on mean (standard deviation) decision aid reliance scores are shown 
on Table 1. 
 
_______________________ 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_______________________ 
 
                                                 
4 Tests of sample equivalence indicated that age, gender and experience did not significantly differ among 
treatments. In addition, a regression model was run to examine the relationship between age, gender, 
experience or risk propensity and decision aid reliance. No significant relation was found among treatment 
conditions; therefore, these variables were not included as covariates in the hypotheses testing. 
 21 
4.2 Hypotheses testing 
An ANOVA5 model was used to test the statistical significance of differences 
among means.6 In addition, non-parametric Mann-Whitney and the Kruskal-Wallis tests 
were conducted to support the results obtained using the ANOVA.  
The results of the ANOVA analysis indicated significant main effects on the three 
variables of interest and the three-way interaction (Table 2). As well, the Kruskal-Wallis 
test indicated that the means of at least two of the treatment conditions were significantly 
different (χ2 = 202.505, p = 0.00). Results of a Bonferroni multiple comparison test (p = 
.05) is shown on Table 2, panel B. 
_______________________ 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_______________________ 
 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) relates to the effects of time pressure on auditors’ reliance 
on decision aids. It predicts that auditors will rely more on decision aids when working 
under high perceived time pressure. A univariate test on reliance indicated that perceived 
time pressure was significant (p = 0.00). Comparison of the group means revealed that 
participants in the high time pressure treatment relied more on the decision aid (mean = 
0.73, σ = 0.20) than participants in the low time pressure condition (mean = 0.31, σ = 
0.20). In addition a Mann-Whitney test indicated a significant mean difference between 
the two groups (Mann-Whitney U = 1117, p = 0.00). Therefore, H1 was supported. 
                                                 
5 The assumptions of independence, normality, and homogeneity were examined and deemed within 
acceptable tolerances. Recognizing that one of the assumptions of ANOVA is interval scaling, differences 
in the DA reliance metric between and across treatments will not be compared on an absolute basis; rather,  
they will be interpreted as ordinal (i.e., either significantly higher or lower). 
6 Statistical testing of manipulation check items indicated the successful manipulation of the three factors.  
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The second hypothesis (H2) deals with the effect of task complexity on auditors’ 
reliance on decision aids. It predicts that auditors will rely more on decision aids when 
they perceive the task to be highly complex to accomplish. A univariate test on reliance 
indicated that perceived task complexity was significant (p = 0.00). Comparison of the 
group means revealed that participants in the high task complexity treatment relied more 
on the decision aid (mean = 0.60, σ = 0.28) than participants in the low time pressure 
condition (mean = 0.43, σ = 0.28). In addition a Mann-Whitney test indicated a 
significant mean difference between the two groups (Mann-Whitney U = 4513.5, p = 
0.00). Therefore, H2 was supported. 
The third hypothesis (H3) relates to the effects of litigation risk on auditors’ 
reliance on decision aids. It predicts that auditors will rely more on decision aids when 
they perceive litigation risk to be high, as compared to low. A univariate test on reliance 
indicated that perceived litigation risk was significant (p = 0.00). Comparison of the 
group means revealed that participants in the high litigation risk treatment relied more on 
the decision aid (mean = 0.66, σ = 0.25) than participants in the low litigation risk 
condition (mean = 0.37, σ = 0.26). In addition a Mann-Whitney test indicated a 
significant mean difference between the two groups (Mann-Whitney U = 2966.5, p = 
0.00). Therefore, H3 was supported. 
Hypothesis H4 deals with a possible interactive effect of litigation risk and task 
complexity.  Specifically, H4 predicts that decision aid reliance will be lowest when 
perceived task complexity and perceived litigation risk are low, and highest when 
perceived task complexity and/or perceived litigation risk are/is high.  The results of the 
ANOVA indicate that the interaction between litigation risk and task complexity is not 
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significant (p = 0.49). Interestingly, this analysis suggests an additive effect of the two 
effectiveness motivators.  Therefore, H4 is not supported. 
The final two hypotheses predict possible joint effects among all three pressure 
sources. The ANOVA results presented in Table 2 indicate a significant three way 
interaction (p = 0.006). In order to further analyze and determine the nature of the 
interaction, two additional ANOVA models were run, one holding time pressure high, 
and the second holding time pressure low. The results of the ANOVA models are 
presented in Table 3. 
_______________________ 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_______________________ 
 
When holding time pressure low, there is no significant interaction between 
litigation risk and task complexity (p = 0.11). Comparison of the group means indicated 
that participants in the high task complexity, high litigation risk treatment had the highest 
level of reliance (mean = 0.55, σ = 0.12). The lowest level of reliance was in the low task 
complexity, low litigation risk treatment (mean = 0.08, σ = 0.04), with the remaining two 
group means falling between these two levels. The Bonferroni multiple pairwise 
comparison test (Table 2 Panel B) indicated that all four of the means were significantly 
different from each other (p = 0.05). In addition Mann-Whitney tests indicated significant 
differences between the groups (p = 0.00). Hence, H5a is not supported.  
When holding time pressure high, the ANOVA analysis indicates a significant 
interactive effect between litigation risk and task complexity (p = 0.028). Although the 
highest level of reliance was in the high litigation risk high task complexity treatment 
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(mean = 0.92, σ = 0.08) and the lowest level of reliance was in the low litigation risk low 
task complexity treatments (mean = 0.47, σ = 0.17), with the two remaining group means 
falling in between these two levels, and they were significantly different (Table 2), the 
results show that the effects of the two factors is not additive. Therefore, H5b is partially 
supported.  
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether auditor reliance on a decision aid 
depends on the level of perceived litigation risk arising from the client, perceived time 
pressure imposed by a budget constraint, and perceived complexity of the audit task. A 
between-subjects experimental design was used to test the hypotheses. The three 
independent variables were time pressure, task complexity and litigation risk.  Each of 
these were manipulated at two levels (high and low). The dependent variable was the 
level of auditor's reliance on a decision aid. 
The results of this study show a positive relationship between perceived time 
pressure, perceived task complexity and perceived litigation risk and auditors’ reliance on 
a decision aid. These results confirm the findings of prior information systems and 
psychology studies examining the effects of task complexity on decision aid reliance, and 
further explain auditors’ decision aid reliance behavior when faced with time pressure or 
litigation risk.  
Auditors will tend to rely more on decision aids in their decision making process 
when working under time pressure. Prior decision aid research documents that using 
decision aids when making decisions under time pressure not only improves the accuracy 
of decisions, but also enhances the efficiency of the decision making process (Kumar, 
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1997; Hayne and Smith, 1996; Chu and Spiers, 2003; and Arnold et al., 2000). Therefore, 
given the importance of decisions made by auditors, these results are expected as auditors 
will tend to rely more on decision aids to improve the efficiency of their judgment 
decisions.  
The positive relationship between litigation risk and auditors’ decision aid reliance 
behavior was also expected. Prior research studying the effects of decision consequences 
on a user’s level of reliance on a decision aids document a positive relationship between 
decision consequences and decision aid reliance (e.g. Arkes et al., 1986; and Boatsman et 
al., 1997). In an auditing engagement, an auditor’s judgment decisions are important. 
When faced with a high risk of litigation, the consequences of making incorrect decisions 
increases. Therefore, in these situations auditors will rely on decision aids to increase the 
effectiveness of their judgment decisions. Additionally, when a law suit is filed, a judge 
or jury may consider adherence to a decision aid (structured guidance) as a positive signal 
of the auditor’s due diligence and responsibility (Jennings et al., 1993). Thus, when faced 
with high perceived litigation risk, auditors are expected to rely more on a decision aid to 
be in a better position to defend themselves if faced with litigation. 
The study also finds that the combination of any of these factors leads to a higher 
level of reliance. These results contradict the findings of Ashton (1990), who showed that 
increasing pressures to improve performance lead to decreased reliance on a decision aid. 
However, the results obtained by his study are explained due to the tournament-style 
incentive scheme used and the relatively low face validity (50%) of the decision aid he 
used in his experiments. By contrast, the current experiment used a fixed incentive 
system and a decision aid with relatively high face validity (80%).  
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The current study also demonstrates that the effects of combining these factors 
were additive in all but one combination; that is, whether litigation risk and task 
complexity interacted depended on the level of time pressure the auditors faced. When 
faced with high time pressure, the presence of litigation risk when performing a highly 
complex task resulted in an interaction between these two factors. These results can be 
explained since each of the factors arises from a different source of pressure for an 
auditor to rely on a decision aid. Both litigation risk and task complexity motivate 
auditors to rely on a decision aid to improve the effectiveness of their decision aid, while 
time pressure motivates auditors to rely on a decision aid to improve the efficiency of the 
audit. When faced with the risk of litigation while performing a task under high time 
pressure, auditors are motivated to rely on the decision aid to improve both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their performance. Adding another motivator to improve 
effectiveness resulted in a small, but not equivalent, increase in the level of decision aid 
reliance. Thus, the marginal benefit from increasing the level of reliance, therefore, 
decreases as additional pressure is induced. 
This study, however, has some limitations. As in any controlled experiment, the 
experimental environment and the audit tasks might not fully reflect real life conditions. 
This will have an effect on the generalizability of the results beyond the experimental 
setting. However, litigation risk, time pressure, and task complexity allows us to draw 
causal inferences through theory to other settings, times and participants. In addition, 
using computer software, though necessary for control during the experiment, might have 
some unknown effect on participants’ behaviors.   
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The importance of this study stems from the need to understand the effects of 
pressure inducers created by time pressure, task complexity and litigation risk on 
auditors’ decisions to incorporate the advice of a decision aid into their the decision 
making processes, and in-turn, on audit judgment. Study findings are particularly 
important in light of the increased litigation cost in the auditing industry. Although some 
research has examined the effect of time pressure and task complexity on auditors’ use of 
decision aids, this study is the first to investigate the joint effect of litigation risk and 
these sources of pressure on the level of auditors’ reliance on decision aids.  
Findings from this study can help provide further explanation of auditors’ 
behaviors with respect to reliance on decision aids and open the door for other future 
research in this area.  For instance, future research might replicate the current study using 
different measures of auditor’s reliance on decision aids. Further, this study limits the 
manipulation of independent variables to two levels (high and low); other studies might 
try to examine the hypothesized relationships using more than two levels of litigation risk 
and time pressure. Another interesting area of future research is to try to measure the 
amount of pressure at which an auditor changes his/her decision from ‘non-reliance’ to 
‘reliance’ on a decision aid.  Finally, although this study theoretically infers the 
motivation for relying on a decision aid (to improve audit effectiveness or efficiency), 
future studies could delve more deeply into such motivation.    
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviation) Responses 
 
Panel A: Low Time Pressure 
 Litigation Risk  
Task Complexity Low High Main Task 
Complexity Effect 
Low 0.08 0.34 0.22 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.15) 
    
High 0.22 0.55 0.38 
 (0.10) (0.17) (0.20) 
 
Main Time Pressure Effect 
 
0.15 
(0.11) 
 
0.45 
(0.15) 
 
 
Panel B: High Time Pressure 
 Litigation Risk  
Task Complexity Low High Main Task 
Complexity Effect 
Low 0.47 0.81 0.63 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.22) 
    
High 0.69 0.92 0.81 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) 
 
Main Time Pressure Effect 
 
0.58 
(0.18) 
 
0.87 
(0.11) 
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Table 2: ANOVA and Multiple Comparisons Results 
Panel A: Tests of Between Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 61.059 1 61.059 5111.498 .000 
TP 10.528 1 10.528 881.369 .000 
LR 4.933 1 4.933 412.936 .000 
TC 1.716 1 1.716 143.641 .000 
TP x LR .002 1 .002 .128 .721 
TP x TC .001 1 .001 .117 .732 
LR x TC .006 1 .006 .489 .485 
TP x LR x 
TC 
.090 1 .090 7.562 .006 
Error 2.712 227 .012   
 
Panel B: Bonferroni Multiple Comparisons 
Treatment 
LTP 
LLR  
LTC 
LTP 
LLR 
HTC 
LTP 
HLR 
LTC 
LTP 
HLR 
HTC 
HTP 
LLR  
LTC 
HTP 
LLR 
HTC 
HTP 
HLR 
LTC 
HTP 
HLR 
HTC 
LTP/LLR/LTC         
LTP/LLR/HTC X        
LTP/HLR/LTC X X       
LTP/HLR/HTC X X X      
HTP/LLR/LTC X X X NS     
HTP/LLR/HTC X X X X X    
HTP/HLR/LTC X X X X X X   
HTP/HLR/HTC X X X X X X X  
TP = Time Pressure   X = The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
TC = Task Complexity   NS = The mean difference is not significant at the 
0.05 level. 
LR = Litigation Risk 
LLR = Low litigation risk 
LTP = Low time pressure 
LTC = Low task complexity 
HLR = High litigation risk 
HTP = High time pressure 
HTC = High task complexity 
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Table 3: Tests of Between Subjects Effects  
 
Panel A: Holding Time Pressure Low 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 10.397 1 10.397 1092.432 .000 
LR 2.544 1 2.544 267.270 .000 
TC .904 1 .904 94.988 .000 
LR x TC .025 1 .025 2.629 .108 
Error 2.712 113 .010   
 
Panel B: Holding Time Pressure High 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 61.396 1 61.396 4277.836 .000 
LR 2.390 1 2.390 166.517 .000 
TC .813 1 .813 56.636 .000 
LR x TC .071 1 .071 4.970 .028 
Error 1.636 113 .014   
Dependent Variable: Reliance 
TC = Task Complexity 
LR = Litigation Risk 
 
 
